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EVIDENCE




EDWARD W. CLEARYA ATTEMPT TO cover significant developments of a decade of ex-
tensive judicial and legislative activity in the field of evidence
within the allotted space poses at the outset a hard choice:
whether to survey in breadth or to dig in some depth. The author has
chosen the latter. Consequently, much has been omitted which may well
be considered of more importance than what is included. Many of the
decisions are arbitrary.
The reader has been left to his own industry to explore such impor-
tant developments as the advent of common sense to the opinion rule,'
and some withering of the rule against impeaching one's own witness.
2
The role of the presumption is left untouched for those who gain relax-
ation from solving puzzles.3 Important legislation, including that which
provides for blood tests in paternity cases, 4 and the Uniform Act to
secure the attendance of witnesses from within or without a state in
criminal cases, receives no mention.5
The effort has been to explore critically some of the important things
which have been done and a few of those which have not been done.
1 Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 11l.2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582
(1960); noted in 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 457.
2 People v. Wesley, 18 I1l.2d 138, 163 N.E.2d 500 (1959); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 60
(1959).
8 Ketdlewell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 4 Ill.2d 383, 122 N.E.2d 817 (1954). Cf. Cleary,
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1959);
ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Nos. 22.01, 50.07, 50.08 (1961).
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106, S§ 1-7, 55 (1959).
r ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 5S 690.1-.6 (1959).
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Illinois was one of the early members of the constantly increasing
group of states giving realistic effect to the constitutional inhibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures by excluding from evidence
the results thereof.6 The propriety of a particular search and seizure
is thus translated into a question of admission or exclusion of evidence.
Developments of significance have occurred in the past ten years, and
it seems likely that the stage has been set for additional changes in this
area.
Years ago the Supreme Court of the United States, in formulating
the rule of exclusion in federal prosecutions of evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, excepted from its operation evidence seized by independ-
ently acting state officers: the Constitution protected only against ac-
tion by federal officers. Under this "silver platter" doctrine, evidence
unlawfully seized by state officers was admissible in federal cases. Illi-
nois adhered to the silver platter doctrine, refusing to exclude evidence
unlawfully seized by Wisconsin officers." The consequence of the doc-
trine was to countenance activities which would have resulted in ex-
clusion if carried on by enforcing officers of the prosecuting juris-
diction. Only recently the Supreme Court of the United States jetti-
soned the silver platter doctrine as encouraging violations of funda-
mental rights, involving a logic beyond the dictates of reason, striking
at the roots of a healthy federalism, and undermining the integrity
of the judicial process itself.9 These are powerful reasons, which might
well induce the Supreme Court of Illinois to abandon the silver platter
doctrine, particularly in view of the fact that original adherence was
in a case involving unlawful seizure in another state, rather than by
federal officers acting in Illinois. 10
Another aspect of the rule excluding unlawfully seized evidence is
the extent of the "parasitic" right of search, incidental to a lawful ar-
6 People v. Brocamp, 307 1. 448,138 N.E. 728 (1923).
7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See McGumi, EVIDENCE OF GUILT
209-17 (1959).
8 People v. Touhy, 361 M11. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935).
9 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
10 People v. Touhy, 36111. .332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935).
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rest. Illinois has adhered to the view that evidence is not to be excluded
because seized in connection with an arrest for another crime.1 As a
general proposition, this view seems to be sound. However, when it
was extended to include arrests for minor traffic violations,' 2 the pos-
sibilities of circumventing basic constitutional guarantees became ap-
parent. Officers without sufficient cause to arrest a suspect on a par-
ticular charge merely had to follow him until he committed the inev-
itable parking or other minor violation; then he could be arrested and
searched. Recently the Supreme Court withdrew its approval of this
practice.' 8 Traditionally, the parasitic right of search has been justified
basically because of the necessity of searching the prisoner for weapons
which might be used to injure the officer or to effect an escape. If
evidence of the crime was found during the search, the realities of
everyday life rebutted any contention that it had to be restored. In
changing its position, the Supreme Court also worked a change in the
basic justifying formula, substituting when for because.'4 As suggested
with vigor in the specially concurring opinion, it may be unrealistic
to "establish by judicial fiat that all minor traffic offenders must be
accepted by arresting officers as persons who pose no threat to their
personal safety."' " The dilemma thus posed between constitutional
abuses and the safety of law enforcement officers is troublesome. Per-
haps a more direct approach, involving inquiry into the motivation of
the arresting officers, would have avoided this particular difficulty.
While exploring motivation is in itself a matter of difficulty, that fact
has never deterred the law from embarking upon it.
A third problem in connection with the rule excluding unlawfully
seized evidence involves the "standing" required to support a motion
to suppress or an objection to admission. Must the accused assert a
property right, e.g., ownership, in the item seized in order to entitle
11 People v. Brown, 354 Ill. 480, 188 N.E. 529 (1933). Accused was arrested for one
bank robbery. Search disclosed evidence of another bank robbery, of which he was
convicted.
12 People v. Edge, 406 111. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950). Accused, arrested for parking
violation and failure to have safety sticker, was convicted of policy violation on the
basis of evidence found. People v. Clark, 9 1ll.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956) (semble).
See also People v. Berry, 17 11.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959).
13 People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960); People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d
136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
14 People v. Watkins, supra note 13, at 18, 166 N.E.2d at 437.
15 Id. at 23, 166 NE.2d at 439.
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him to complain of the manner in which it was seized? In the first two
cases announcing the rule of exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence,
the defendants unabashedly asserted ownership 16 or possession."
Thereafter, however, the possibility seems to have occurred to defense
counsel that such statements might be allowed in evidence as admis-
sions,18 and petitions to suppress which omit any reference to owner-
ship appear repeatedly in the cases. The Supreme Court of Illinois
then held time after time that an accused could not raise the question
of unlawful seizure unless he claimed ownership of the property and
asked for its return.19 True, on one occasion in a burglary case involv-
ing unlawful seizure of the stolen registered bonds, the court scented
some inconsistency in its position:
If, in order to have them suppressed he must allege that he owned them,
then he has in effect been compelled to admit the possession of stolen property
recently following a crime, which is sufficient in itself, unless explained, to
authorize conviction. 20
The difficulty was resolved by ruling that the petition to suppress need
not allege ownership when the unlawful seizure occurred at the home
of the accused. The distinction is unwarranted: unlawful seizure is
unlawful seizure. While the locus may be a factor properly to be con-
sidered in determining the legality of the seizure, it should not affect
the consequences of a seizure once determined to be unlawful. The
distinction might be tenable if "home" is equated to possession, but
this the court has not done.
The dilemma of the accused who could not claim ownership or
right of possession without confessing guilt or at least making a very
damaging admission was again considered in People v. Perry," in which
the accused was convicted of unlawfully possessing slot machines
owned by a club of which he was manager. The court saw no paradox
in the position of an accused who could have possession sufficient to
10People v. Brocamp, 307 IMI. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923) (prosecution for receiving
stolen property).
17 People v. Castree, 311 111. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924) (prosecution for unlawful pos-
session and sale of liquor).
Is This fear finds support in State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac. 837 (1922).
19 People v. Exum, 382 M. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94
N.E.2d 359 (1950); People v. Perry, 1 ll.2d 482, 116 N.E.2d 360 (1953); People v. Gam-
bino, 12 Ill.2d 29, 145 N.E.2d 42 (1957); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill.2d 581, 153 N.E.2d
578 (1958).
20 People v. Grod, 385 M. 584, 591, 53 N.E.2d 591, 595 (1944).
211 ll1.2d 482, 116 N.E.2d 360 (1953).
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support a charge of illegal possession but not sufficient to support a
claim of unlawful seizure. 22
From the number and overall consistency of the decisions, it might
be concluded that so far as Illinois is concerned law-enforcing officers
may proceed freely to effect unlawful seizures as long as their efforts
are confined to items of which possession is in itself a crime or tanta-
mount to proof of crime, e.g., narcotics and stolen property. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of the United States recently considered the
question of standing to complain of unlawful seizure and came up
with a different answer. In a narcotics case, the District Court denied
a motion to suppress the narcotics because the accused claimed neither
ownership of the articles seized nor a possessory interest in the locus.
Conceding the general principle that only the victim of an invasion of
privacy could complain, the Court perceived a difference in the cases
in which possession equalled or tended to equal guilt. The Court fitted
the dilemma shoe on the other foot: The government sought to base
a conviction on a possession which was not sufficient to support a claim
of unlawful seizure. Consequently, the government should be required
ordinarily to choose between opposing a motion to suppress made
before trial and basing the case on possession.13 And even more re-
cently the Supreme Court of Illinois, in rejecting a contention by the
State that unlawfully seized evidence would be suppressed only when
self-incriminating, gave a clear indication of its willingness to re-exam-
ine the entire matter of standing. 4
WIRETAPPING-ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
The Federal Communications Act,25 once the initial shock of con-
struing "any person" as including a federal officer26 is surmounted,
has on the whole received a narrow construction. None of the fol-
lowing has been held to violate the statute: wiring a stool pigeon for
sound so as secretly to broadcast a conversation with a suspect for the
benefit of tuned-in government agents;27 applying the detectaphone
22 Id. at 488, 116 N.E.2d at 364.
23 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
24 People v. Mayo, 19 IlI.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960) (citing Jones v. United States,
supra note 23).
25 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1960).
26 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
27 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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to the wall so as to pick up directly the voice of a person talking on
the telephone; 28 listening on an extension telephone without the knowl-
edge of the person at the other end of the line.29
In Illinois, the Electronic Eavesdropping Act of 195730 requires a
contrary result in each of these situations. Electronic eavesdropping
is defined as:
the use of any device employing electricity to hear or record, or both, all or
any part of any oral conversation ... without consent of any party thereto,
whether such conversation is conducted in person or by telephone. .... 31
So stringent is the definition that specific exceptions were required in
order to legalize the use of hearing aids by the deaf and the enjoyment
of radio and television broadcasts. The statute purports to extend its
prohibitions to all persons, including both state and federal officers.
The validity of its application to federal officers is, of course, open
to serious doubt.3 2 Violation of the act is a misdemeanor.33 Further
eavesdropping may be enjoined, and both actual and punitive damages
may be recovered. 4 The act further provides that evidence obtained
in violation of its provisions is inadmissible in evidence. 3
Two further situations which have been passed upon in connection
with the Federal Communications Act36 may deserve comment. (a)
In the second Nardone case, 7 evidence derived from illicit wiretapping
was held to be inadmissible, as being, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's famed
phrase, "a fruit of the poisonous tree." The extent to which violation
of the Illinois act will taint other evidence is not spelled out specifically
in the statute. However, under the provision that evidence "obtained
in violation of this Act is not admissible, ' 3 8 reinforced by the provision
making a person guilty of a misdemeanor who "uses ... information"
28 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
29 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
30 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 206.1-.5 (1959).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 206.1 (1959).
32 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (upholding the power of Congress to
grant a witness immunity against prosecution by a state).
83 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.2 (1959).
34 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.3 (a)-(e) (1959).
35 LL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.3 (f) (1959).
30 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1960).
37 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 206.3 (f) (1959).
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obtained in violation of the act,89 plus case law suppressing evidence
discovered through information contained in evidence obtained through
unlawful search and seizure, 40 the fruit of the poisonous tree rule seems
to be indicated. Nevertheless, this result reasonably would seem to be
limited to instances in which the information was obtained by engaging
in electronic eavesdropping, and no tainting would follow in a situation
in which a face to face conversation was illicitly recorded. Some
analogy to the best evidence rule may be apparent. (b) The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a person who was not a party
to the illicitly intercepted communication does not have standing to
object to its use.4 The Illinois act provides:
Any or all parties to any conversation upon which electronic eavesdropping
is practiced ... shall have the following rights:
(f) Any evidence obtained in violation . . . is not admissible .... 42
The language in subsection (f) taken alone is sufficiently broad to
confer standing to object upon one who was not a party to the inter-
cepted conversation, yet the introductory language of the section lim-
its standing to a party to the conversation. The intervening subsections
seem clearly to make the remedies of injunction and damages avail-
able only to parties to the conversation. 8 Moreover, the "use" of
information obtained by illegal electronic eavesdropping is made a
misdemeanor.4 4 Thus, competing rules of expressio unius and eiusdern
generis result in a considerable problem of statutory construction.
People v. Mayo,45 involving unlawful search and seizure, may well
indicate a disposition on the part of the Supreme Court of Illinois to
recognize standing on the part of a person not a party to the conver-
sation, when and if the question arises. This construction would seem
to conform to the overall purpose and policy of the legislation, in the
absence of clear indication from the language itself.
39 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 206.4 (1959).
40 People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942).
41 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). Government witnesses who con-
fessed and turned state's evidence when confronted with the intercepted telephone con-
versations were held properly permitted to testify.
42 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.3 (1959).
43 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.3 (a)-(e) (1959).
44 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.4 (1959).
45 19 ll1.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
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BLOOD TESTS FOR ALCOHOL
In 1957, the Legislature provided for the admission in evidence of
chemical analyses of breath, blood, urine, saliva, or other bodily sub-
stance, in cases of driving under the influence of liquor, with attendant
presumptions that the person was or was not under the influence, or
no presumption at all, variously depending upon the results of the
analysis. 46 The great weight of scientific authority supports the ac-
curacy and reliability of tests of this nature, and no serious contention
against admissibility can be made on the ground of invalidity of the
scientific method, provided there is compliance with usual require-
ments for admitting chemical analyses.47
Constitutional problems which have been raised in many jurisdic-
tions have not been passed upon in Illinois.4" In Breithaupt v. Abram, 4
the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a New Mexico con-
viction in a case in which a physician had, at the instance of police,
removed a blood specimen while the accused was unconscious. The
conviction was sustained against attack on the grounds of self-incrim-
ination, unlawful search and seizure, and violation of due process. The
rather limited effect of this decision must be noted. The fourteenth
amendment does not require the states to recognize the privilege against
self-incrimination 0 or to exclude unlawfully seized evidence.51 Hence,
the only available ground was brutal and offensive police tactics within
the purview of Rochin v. California,52 which the three dissenters
thought applicable.
46 lu. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , S 144(b) (1959). For a recent comprehensive survey, see
Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal Problems of Chemical
Testing, 44 MINN. L. REv. 673 (1960).
47 The admissibility of breath tests was sustained in People v. Bobczyk, 343 IMI. App.
504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951), and in People v. Gamier, 20 IMI. App.2d 492, 156 N.E.2d 613
(1959). In Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 27 IM. App.2d 1, 169 N.E.2d 119
(1960), the scientific validity of blood tests was recognized, but the persnickety per-
sistence on a detailed accounting for the specimen which characterizes many analysis
cases resulted in exclusion. None of these cases mentions the 
statute.
4 8 In People v. Bobczyk, supra note 47, constitutional questions were waived by ap-
pealing to the Appellate Court. In the other cases cited in supra note 47, no effort seems
to have been made to raise constitutional questions, and in any event they would have
been waived by appealing to the Appellate Court.
49 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
50 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
51 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
52 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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Serious constitutional objection seems to lie only in regard to the
taking of blood samples without consent. Obtaining specimens of
breath, urine, or saliva in the natural course of nature seems to involve
no problem of self-incrimination or unlawful seizure, even though
some invasion of privacy may be inevitable. The taking of blood, how-
ever, which is by far the most satisfactory method of testing, does
require a substantial infringement upon bodily integrity, which quite
conceivably could result in coercive tactics of modestly Star Chamber
proportions. While most courts have sustained the validity of taking
blood specimens without consent, a serious doubt may well be raised.
The Illinois statute makes no provisions as to the manner in which the
specimen is to be obtained. Nor does the statute spell out the applica-
tion or effect of the presumptions for which it provides. Presumably,
they will be put before the jury in the form of appropriate instructions,
with the larceny cases which depend on proof of possession perhaps
suggesting a pattern." Certainly any thought of applying the "bursting
bubble" theory to such a presumption is inappropriate. In view of the
recognized scientific basis for these presumptions, they seem immune
against any claim of unconstitutionality on the ground of absence of
rational connection between the basic facts and the presumed fact.54
PRIVILEGE
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
The purpose of the whole process of trial is to get at the truth.
Since a privilege is designed to suppress the truth, the relationship to
be protected or the policy to be promoted should indeed be compel-
ling in order to justify the suppression of the truth which any privilege
engenders. The courts, in the common-law process of making law
through decision, have been sparing in their recognition of privileges.
The legislatures over the country have bowed more freely to the pres-
sures of professional and other groups to create privileges in consid-
erable variety, most of them of dubious merit.
In 1959, Illinois lost an engagement in the war of unsound privi-
leges by joining the large group of states with statutes recognizing a
physician-patient privilege. The loss, however, appears to have been
exceedingly minor. The statute adds a new section, 5.1, to the Evidence
Act, reading as follows:
53 People v. Stone, 349 111. 52, 181 N.E. 648 (1932).
54 Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he
may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, neces-
sary to enable him professionally to serve such patient, except only (1) in
trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate
circumstances of the homicide, (2) in all mental illness inquiries, (3) in ac-
tions, civil or criminal, against the physician for malpractice, (4) with the ex-
pressed consent of the patient, or in case of his death or disability, of his per-
sonal representative or other person authorized to sue for personal injury or
of the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life, health, or physical condi-
tion, (5) in all civil suits brought by or against the patient, his personal rep-
resentative, a beneficiary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or ad-
ministrator of his estate wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is
an issue, (6) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will of the
patient, or (7) in any criminal action where the charge is either murder by
abortion, attempted abortion or abortion.55
Except for the exceptions, the statute is a paraphrase of the New York
statute of 1828,56 which has been the inspiration of legislation in many
states. 7 Though the commentators almost to a man have agreed on
the unsoundness of privilege in this area,5 s except in regard to the
psychiatrist,59 the steady "me too" insistence of the doctors has been
effective. However, the only real harm accomplished by the Illinois
statute seems to lie in its recognition of the principle.
Several comments on the Illinois enactment are called for. In the
first place, while the section purportedly applies to criminal proceed-
ings, it seems to be wholly ineffective in this respect on constitutional
grounds. The act amends "An Act in regard to evidence and deposi-
tions in civil cases." To include in an amendment to an act so entitled,
a change in the rules of evidence in criminal cases is about as obvious
a violation of the requirement that the subject be expressed in the
title60 as can be imagined.6' It seems clear that the act can have no
application whatever in criminal cases.
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1959).
56 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. Part III, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73 (1829).
57 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 2380 (3d ed. 1940).
58 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 211-24 (1954), contains a comprehensive discussion, with
full references to the literature.
59 Note, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 384 (1952); ASSOCIATON OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS,
SELECTED ARTmILES ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 254 (Fryer ed. 1957); GROUP FOR ADVANCE-
MENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY (1960).
60 ILL. CONST. art. 4, 1 3.
61Bradley v. Casey, 415 IIl. 576, 114 N.E.2d 681 (1953); Johnson v. Daley, 403 IUI.
338, 86 N.E.2d 350 (1949).
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Secondly, the exceptions enumerated in the act by their terms ren-
der the act inapplicable in most types of litigation which are likely to
occur. In view of the elimination of mental illness inquiries by excep-
tion (2), of malpractice cases by exception (3), of suits in which the
patient's physical or mental condition is an issue by exception (5),
and of will contests by exception (6), no small mental agility is re-
quired to imagine a situation in which either the application of the
statute is not expressly negated or the consent of the patient or his
representative will not be forthcoming under exception (4). The only
one coming readily to mind is an action by a physician to recover fees
for services rendered, a twist not without irony in a statute enacted
in response to the demands of the profession.
Thirdly, if we are seriously concerned with maintaining the secrecy
of professional confidences rather than merely with keeping the truth
from coming out in court, serious thought ought to be given to fol-
lowing the pattern set by the French, making the disclosure of pro-
fessional secrets a crime."'
The practical nonexistence of areas for applying the Illinois statute
renders unnecessary any discussion of problems which have arisen
elsewhere as to when the physician-patient relationship exists, the
extent of matters included within the privilege, and when and how
the privilege is waived.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
GRANTS OF IMMUNITY
Granting immunity from prosecution as a means of requiring a wit-
ness to give testimony which otherwise would be self-incriminating
has had an interesting history in Illinois. In People v. Bogolowski,6 4
the court held that the giving of testimony in reliance upon a promise
of immunity by the prosecutor was a complete defense to prosecution
for an offense disclosed in the testimony. Logically, this of course
62 CODE PN iAL FRANqATS art. 378 (France 1934). See Purrington, An Abused Privilege,
6 COLUM. L. REv. 388, 394 (1906). An exhaustive discussion of art. 378 is found in 6
GARRAUD, TRAITi DU DROIT PENAL FRANgAIS 63-89 (1935).
63 Thus the Illinois courts need not decide whether the privilege includes veteri-
narians. See Hendershott v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 106 Iowa 529, 76 N.W. 828
(1898), in which the symptoms of Bravo, a sick horse, were held inviolate by the trial
judge, whose view, however, found no adherent on appeal. Sed quaere as to what
would constitute consent.
64 326 ill. 253, 157 N.E. 181 (1927).
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suggested the possibility of compelling any witness to testify in return
for a promise of immunity by the prosecutor, since the promise would
remove any incriminating aspect of the testimony given. However, in
People v. Rockola,65 the court refused to accept the logic of the situa-
tion and held that an unwilling witness could not be compelled to
testify over a claim of self-incrimination by the prosecutor's promise
of immunity. Although it was well concealed, there was in fact much
wisdom in this decision in its effect of curtailing what otherwise would
have amounted to an uncontrolled power of pardon in prosecutors as
to all kinds of offenses.
The initial approach of the Legislature to compelling testimony in
return for a grant of immunity was limited to crimes involving diffi-
culties of proof without a witness who would turn state's evidence,
e.g., bribery66 and extortion."' Provisions for immunity were included
in the Cigarette Tax Act of 194568 in connection with investigations
thereunder. The legislative approach to the problem which lay in the
background of Roekola 9 lacked consistency: Action by the court
was required in bribery cases, while in the extortion and cigarette cases
the immunity arose simply by virtue of giving testimony in response
to a subpoena at the instance of the State's Attorney or Department of
Revenue.
In 1953, a statute was adopted ° which applies to grand jury inves-
tigations and trials of all criminal offenses. The grant of immunity is
by the court, upon motion by the State's Attorney and a showing that
the person is a material witness for the prosecution and that his testi-
mony would tend to incriminate him. In these respects the Illinois
statute substantially conforms to the Model State Witness Immunity
Act.71 The Model Act, however, affords no protection against pros-
ecution under the laws of another jurisdiction, and no such protection
is afforded under the Illinois bribery, extortion, and cigarette tax stat-
utes mentioned previously. Constitutionally, this protection is not
65 339 Ill. 474,171 N.E. 559 (1930).
66 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 82 (1959).
67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 245 (1959).
68 lu. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 453.10a (1959).
69 People v. Rockola, 339 Ill. 474, 171 N.E. 559 (1930).
70 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 580a (1959).
71 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 186.
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required.72 Nevertheless, the general Illinois statute73 provides against
the entry of an order if it reasonably appears that the giving of the
testimony would subject the witness to prosecution under the laws of
another state or of the United States. Thus the Legislature has made
the privilege against self-incrimination truly effective, attaining a more
palatable result than that reached by the courts.74
CONFESSIONS
Involuntary confessions are inadmissible, whether on grounds of
unreliability75 or violation of due process.76 Illinois has been particularly
plagued by uncertainty concerning the kind of statement by an ac-
cused to which this rule of exclusion should apply. One line of cases
has held that the rule applies only to statements which constitute com-
prehensive admissions of guilt.77 Another line of cases has held that
the principle of exclusion is to be applied to all admissions by an ac-
cused, whether technically "confessions" or not.78 The situation is a
poor one in which to engage in finespun distinctions as to whether the
extorted statement is a "confession" or merely an "admission." Nor
should the fact that the statement is "exculpatory" in nature, as em-
phasized in some of the cases, 79 be significant. The extortion of a state-
ment by coercion or promises is equally a violation of fundamental
rights of an accused and repugnant to ideas of due process, regardless
of the nature of the statement. One would have thought the distinction
had been laid at rest once and for all in People v. Hiller,80 had the court
72 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); People v. Butler St. Foundry, 201 Ill.
236, 66 N.E. 349 (1903).
7 3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 580a (1959).
74 See Black, J., dissenting in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 382 (1958). People
v. Burkert, 7 Ill.2d 506, 131 N.E.2d 495 (1955), gave this provision of the statute a
construction very favorable to the reluctant witness.
75 People v. Fox, 319 111. 606,150 N.E. 347 (1926).
76 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); People v. Rogers, 413 Ill. 554, 110 N.E.2d
201 (1953).
77 People v. Kircher, 309 Ill. 500, 141 N.E. 151 (1923); People v. Okopske, 321 111. 32,
151 N.E. 507 (1926); People v. Wynekoop, 359 Ill 124, 194 N.E. 276 (1934); People v.
Mowry, 6 I1l.2d 132, 126 N.E.2d 683 (1955); People v. Stanton, 16 Ill.2d 459, 158 N.E.2d
47 (1959).
78 People v. Santucci, 374 Ill. 395, 29 N.E.2d 508 (1940); People v. Hiller, 2 Ill.2d 323,
118 N.E.2d 11 (1954).
79 People v. Okopske, 321 MI1. 32, 151 N.E. 507 (1926); People v. Wynekoop, 359 11.
124, 194 N.E. 276 (1934); People v. Mowry, 6 Ill.2d 132, 126 N.E.2d 683 (1955).
802 ll1.2d 323, 118 N.E.2d 11 (1954).
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not resumed its old ways in subsequent cases."' This is an area in which
state concepts of due process have been reviewed without hesitation
by the Supreme Court of the United States, which has rejected the
distinction.12
Another troublesome problem in the area of confessions is the use
of failure to deny as an admission. The adage, "Silence gives con-
sent," is nullified by its contrary, "Silence is golden." The inference
of acquiescence is a weak one at best. The notion that "whatever you
say can be used against you" is pretty well imbedded in the lore of
ordinary people. Advice of counsel may intervene. Particularly when
coupled with a supposed distinction between confessions and mere
admissions, discussed in the preceding paragraph, both the temptation
and the opportunity to manufacture some evidence are present in a high
degree. Perhaps some of the objectionable aspects would be removed
by drawing a line between cases in which the accused is in the custody
of the police and those in which he is not. The decisions, however,
have shown no inclination to make the distinction, and the practice
continues. 83
In line with decisions of state courts generally, Illinois has refused
to follow the McNabb-Mallory rule"4 that a confession obtained dur-
ing illegal detention ipso facto is inadmissible, and has held that illegal
detention is merely a circumstance to be taken into consideration in
reaching a determination whether the confession is voluntary. 5
Considerable sensitivity has been demonstrated by the Legislature
in regard to confessions. Legislation has been enacted to afford an
accused the opportunity to move in advance of trial to suppress a
confession, as well as to object to its admission at the trial.86 The judge
is not to "require, request or suggest," during the trial, that an accused
submit to a lie detector or truth serum test. 7
More important is legislation which requires that the accused be
81 People v. Mowry, 6 Ill.2d 132, 126 N.E.2d 683 (1955); People v. Stanton, 16 Ill.2d
459, 158 N.E.2d 47 (1959).
8 2 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
83 People v. Homer, 8 Ill.2d 268, 133 N.E.2d 284 (1956); People v. Torres, 19 1Il.2d
497, 167 N.E.2d 412 (1960).
84 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S,
449 (1957).
85 People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 110 N.E.2d 249 (1953).
8 6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 736.1 (1959).
87 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 736.2 (1959).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
furnished a copy of his confession, if written, and with a list of the
persons present, whether oral or written. The statute applies only to
confessions "made before any law enforcement officer or agency in
this State." In the absence of compliance with the statute, the con-
fession is inadmissible.8" Thus Illinois has made his confession available
to the accused in advance of trial, a result which has been reached else-
where by means of judicially constructed discovery procedures. 0 The
Illinois statute has been before the Supreme Court several times. As
would be expected, the term "confession" has been construed as in-
cluding only comprehensive admissions of guilt,0 a construction which
appears to be wholly reasonable bearing in mind that a statute, not a
constitution, is being expounded. The Legislature could have avoided
this result, had it chosen to do so, by using instead the word "state-
ment." In People v. Pelkola,91 however, in which the statute con-
cededly was not complied with, the presence of other competent evi-
dence in the record to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt was
held to render the error in permitting the confession to be used non-
prejudicial. This is an apprach with which the Supreme Court of the
United States once toyed in cases involving involuntary confessions
as a violation of due process,92 but later disclaimed.9s It may well be
that the difference between a basic constitutional right and a statutory
right, in effect, to discovery justifies the attitude of the Illinois court.0 4
The more one wanders through the maze of attempts to guard
against the abuse of confessions the more one wonders whether the
ultimate wisdom may not have been reached by the great Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen in section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872:
No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be
proved as against such person.95
88 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 729 (1959).
89 People v. Cartier, 51 Cal.2d 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959).
90 People v. Stanton, 16 Ill.2d 459, 158 N.E.2d 47 (1959); People v. Nelson, 18 1ll.2d
313, 164 N.E.2d 16 (1960).
9119 Ill.2d 156, 166 N.E.2d 54 (1960).
92 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
90 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
94 Cf. People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957). It may
be significant that the noncompliance in Pelkola, was failure to disclose the name of a
person who was present, rather than failure to furnish a copy of the confession, it
being oral.
95 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF GENERAL ACTS AND CODES OF INDIA 618 (Sapru ed. 1936). Out-
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HUSBAND AND WIFE
Important clarification of the competency of and communications
between husband and wife has been effected in People v. Palumbo.96
At common law husband and wife were incompetent to testify for or
against the other, and a privilege existed as to confidential communi-
cations between them during the marriage. In addition, the Illinois
cases established a rule against admitting testimony of a spouse as to
any conversation or admission or any knowledge gained through the
marriage relation, it being unclear whether this was based on incom-
petency or privilege.97 In criminal cases these principles prevailed
until 1937, unchanged by statute.9 In civil cases, the Act of 1867 and
later acts99 effected some minor exceptions, but here, too, the common-
law principles in general prevailed until 1935. In 1934, because the
Supreme Court of the United States had recently refused longer to
follow the common-law rule which disqualified the wife from testify-
ing for the husband, 00 the Supreme Court of Illinois was urged to do
likewise but declined, saying that the matter should be left to the
Legislature.' The Legislature responded the next year by amending
section 5 of the Evidence Act to read as follows:
In all civil actions husband and wife may testify for or against each other,
provided that neither may testify as to any communication or admission made
by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between them during
coverture, except in actions between such husband and wife, and in actions
where the custody or support of their children is directly in issue, and as to
matters in which either has acted as agent for the other.10 2
cries from the police would no doubt be forthcoming, but such was the case when the
Illinois court rejected involuntary confessions. See People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136
N.E. 470 (1922). Similar cries rent the sunny skies of California when the admissibility
of unlawfully seized evidence was repudiated in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955).
96 5 Ill.2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955).
9 7 Reeves v. Herr, 59 1. 81 (1871); Schreffler v. Chase, 245 11. 395, 92 N.E. 272 (1910).
9 8 The opinion in People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill.2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955), erroneously
intimates that the Evidence Act governs husband-wife testimony in criminal cases: The
act in fact applies only to civil cases. See cases cited supra note 61.
99 IMI. Laws 1867, at 185; Ill. Laws 1874, at 98.
100 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
101 People v. Kendall, 357 111. 448, 192 N.E. 378 (1934).
102 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 5 (1950).
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Substantially the same language was added to the CRIMINAL CODE in
1937.08
So strong at times, however, is the preference of courts for judicial
as opposed to legislative wisdom that the old principles for a while
continued to prevail, despite the legislative enactments. It was held that
the wife could not, over objection by the opposite party, testify to a
conversation with her husband,0 and that the incompetency still
extended to knowledge gained through the marriage relationship. 105
These holdings were clearly contrary to the purpose of the legisla-
tion: to remove the rule of incompetency entirely and to preserve
only a privilege as to confidential communications between the spouses.
While the word "confidential" was not used by the Legislature, it seems
ineluctably to be contemplated, and such has been the usual construc-
tion of statutes of this kind.10 6 Finally, in 1955, the Supreme Court care-
fully reviewed the entire matter and ruled that the effect of the statu-
tory changes was to eliminate the common-law disqualification of
husband and wife and to leave only a privilege as to confidential com-
munications between them.0 7 And a communication in the presence
of a third person does not meet the requirement of confidentiality.'
A further question, not yet answered in Illinois, concerns the owner-
ship of the privilege. May either spouse claim it, or may it be claimed
only by the communicating spouse? Since the matter is, in most juris-
dictions, governed by statute, and the statutes vary widely, decisions
holding that either spouse may claim the privilege on the basis of the
local statute are not persuasive.0 9 If, as seems to be the case, the pur-
pose of the privilege is to encourage freedom of communication,
Wigmore's conclusion that the privilege should belong only to the
communicating spouse, seems, as Professor McCormick suggests, to
be convincing.110
108 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 734 (1959).
104 Dunn v. Heasley, 375 111. 43, 30 N.E.2d 628 (1940).
105 Heineman v. Hermann, 385 1. 191, 52 N.E.2d 263 (1943).
106 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 172 (1954).
107 People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill.2d 409,125 N.E.2d 518 (1955).
108 Ibid.
100 The CAL. CIVIL CODE S 1881 (1), for example, clearly contemplates permitting
either spouse to claim the privilege.
110 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 106, at 176; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 2340 (3d ed.
1940).
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MATTERS IN PREPARATION OF TRIAL
The advent of liberal discovery has brought with it problems of
privilege intimately associated with the everyday work of the lawyers.
Two recent decisions, one suggesting"' and the other holding"' that
matter which is privileged against discovery as the "work product"
of the lawyer is not privileged against compulsory production at the
trial, call for some re-examination of basic considerations.
The purpose of discovery was well described in People ex rel. Noren
v. Dempsey:
Excessive emphasis upon the adversary aspects of our system, and hence upon
the sporting chances of a trial, has yielded to universal recognition of the
role of a trial as a search for truth. Limited discovery, available only in equity,
has been replaced by comprehensive discovery available in all actions." 3
That case sustained the authority of trial judges to require personal
injury plaintiffs to submit to physical examination at the instance of
the defendant and was shortly followed by the adoption of Supreme
Court rule 17-1, setting forth a comprehensive scheme for physical
and mental examinations.
The new rules which the Supreme Court announced on September
19, 1955, to become effective January 1, 1956, concurrently with the
revision of the Civil Practice Act, contain extensive provisions for
discovery, substantially along the lines of the Federal Rules. Un-
like the Federal Rules, the Illinois Rules anticipated a measure of con-
flict between liberal discovery and the effective functioning of the
lawyer. Rule 19-5 includes the following provision:
(1) Matters Privileged Against Discovery.
All matters which are privileged against disclosure upon the trial are privi-
leged against disclosure through any discovery procedure. Disclosure of
memoranda, reports or documents made by or for a party in preparation for
trial or any privileged communications between any party or his agent and
the attorney for the party shall not be required through any discovery pro-
cedure." 4
In terms, the foregoing language creates an exemption only from
discovery. Under the familiar principle of expressio unius, the con-
struction would appear to be that memoranda, reports, or documents
Ill Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 III. App.2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (lst Dist. 1959).
112 Haskell v. Siegmund, 28 Ill. App.2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (3d Dist. 1960).
113 10 Il1.2d 288, 293, 139 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1957).
114 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 19-5.
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made in preparation for trial would not be exempt from compulsory
production at the trial. However, the matter is not so simple.
In the great case of Hickman v. Taylor,"' the Supreme Court of
the United States in effect wrote a love letter to the lawyers, who had
begun to doubt their place in the affections of the Court. The case
arose as a result of efforts to discover statements taken by an attorney
from witnesses. Some of the statements were written, some oral. No
communication between attorney and client was, of course, involved.
The Court voted unanimously against allowing the discovery. Mr.
Justice Murphy, writing for the majority, phrased the problem in
terms of whether discovery could be used "to inquire into materials
collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation
for possible litigation." 116 In concluding that the attempt fell outside
the arena of discovery, he stressed the public interest in the proper
functioning of the legal profession and pointed out that the profession
could not function properly. unless the lawyer were permitted to
"work with a certain degree of privacy," "without undue and need-
less interference." If such materials were thrown open, much would
not be written. "Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practice" would
result, with a demoralizing effect on the profession. 117 Having thus
laid out the general controlling interests, the opinion then approaches
the written and the oral statements by somewhat different routes. If
production of the written statements is sought by order to produce,
Federal rule 34 requires a showing of good cause; if sought in con-
nection with the taking of a deposition, then Federal rule 30(b)
gives the trial judge, for good cause, discretion to limit the inquiry:
the fact that the materials are in preparation for trial precludes the
good cause in the one instance and furnishes it in the other. As to the
oral statement, to require the attorney to testify concerning it would
reduce the attorney to the status of ordinary witness, rather than
officer of the court, and the standards of the profession would suffer.
However, as regards either kind of statement, it would be recognized
that rare situations involving hardship may justify departures."'
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson stressed not only the
15 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
116 Id. at 505.
1I Id. at 510-11.
I's Id. at 512-13. It should be noted that the Illinois rule in terms does not apply to
oral statements at all.
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importance to society of the legal profession, 119 but also of the adver-
sary system. Discovery is not intended to enable the profession to
function "without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary."' 20
Requiring a lawyer to tell what a witness has told him, inexact at best,
could well result in forcing the lawyer to take the stand to defend his
own credibility, in the event his version were used to impeach the
witness. 12' Thus we find faint overtones of a property right, as well
as concern for the functioning of the profession.
The essential basis for exempting preparations for trial from dis-
covery, then, is the insuring of effective working conditions for the
profession. In this respect, the underlying policy is very closely allied
to that which gives rise to the privilege for communications between
attorney and client: affording conditions under which adequate legal
advice and representation are fostered. The subsidiary notion that a
party has a property right in the fruits of his own counsel's endeavor,
as a further support for exempting preparatory materials, is less im-
pressive and yields more readily to the overall public interest in pro-
moting access to facts.
Thus approached, the problem of requiring disclosure at the trial
of materials exempt from discovery may require a different general
answer from that reached in the two cases mentioned at the outset.'12
It may be that the knowledge that his preparatory materials are subject
to invasion only at the trial stage would have a somewhat less disturb-
ing effect upon the lawyer's preparation, and that the usefulness to
the opponent of such invasion would be slighter, with a correspond-
ingly diminished disposition to embark upon it. Yet the difference is
only one of degree and involves an inquiry upon which we do not
embark when the attorney-client privilege is invoked.
The fact is that in each of the two cases the court was confronted
with particular aspects. Kemeny v. Skorch"13 concerned the report of
a physician who conducts an examination to enable him to testify, a
type of witness which the court was more than prepared to place in
119 Id. at 515.
120 Id. at 516.
1211d. at 517.
122 Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Ill. App.2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1959); Haskell
v. Siegmund, 28 111. App.2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (3d Dist. 1960). Cf. Walker v. Struthers,
273 111. 387, 112 N.E. 961 (1916); Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 I1.2d
431, 143 N.E.2d 40 (1957).
123 22 I. App.2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1959).
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a category for special treatment." Haskell v. Siegmund12 involved
a true hardship situation: the insured owner of the car, since deceased,
had given a statement that the car was being driven with his permission,
evidence which otherwise was obtainable only with difficulty and
uncertainty and from a doubtful source since the driver was at the
time of trial in the penitentiary. Regardless of how one may feel about
putting the medical expert in a class for special treatment, the result
in Haskell would better have been reached under a hardship exception,
as recognized in Hickman v. Taylor.26 When SUPREME COURT RULE
19-5 was drafted, the Joint Committee debated at length the wisdom
of including a hardship exception in subsection (1). None was in-
cluded, a decision which might well be considered open to review at
this time. Creating a hardship exception in the civil cases would fit
into the pattern of the criminal cases which recognize a hardship situa-
tion resulting from the built-in inequality of the adversaries, and afford




The admissibility of business records in evidence continues to be
a source of confusion and uncertainty. Much of the difficulty arises
from misapprehension of the purpose and effect of section 3 of the
Evidence Act. 12 The original purpose of section 3 is clear: it dealt
124 In this connection, consider the proposal for court-appointed experts.
125 28 111. App.2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (3d Dist. 1960). Other questions may be raised in
connection with Haskell: Was the statement truly against interest, since the granting of
permission also brought the policy into operation, thus protecting the declarant with
coverage and obligating the insurer to finance the defense if he were sued? Was the
decision correct in excluding the statement from the attorney-client privilege on the
basis that the statement was obtained by a claim agent rather than by an attorney?
Was the decision correct in denying the statement of the insured the protection of the
attorney-client privilege because it was obtained in preparation for trial of a case
against the driver, although the factor of ownership would have helped make a case
against the insured?
126 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
127 People v. Moses, 11 Ill.2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957); People v. Wolff, 19 Ill.2d 318,
167 N.E.2d 197 (1960). Moses preceded, Wolff followed and adopted the procedure
outlined in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and subsequent congressional
enactment. The statements are not available prior to trial but only after the witness has
testified on direct.
128 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, S 3 (1959).
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primarily with the competency of witnesses. In fact, the title of the
act in which it first appeared was "An Act relating to the competency
of witnesses in civil cases.' 1 29 Most of the provisions of this act remain
unchanged in the present Evidence Act; though some deletions and
changes have been made, they are not of basic importance in connec-
tion with business records. The fundamental design of the statute has
not been altered. Section 1 removes generally the incompetency of
parties and interested persons to testify which had existed at common
law. Section 2 (the Dead Man's Act) constitutes an exception to
section 1, preserving the common-law incompetency in the Dead Man
situations, with certain exceptions. Section 3 is a further exception to
section 2, permitting a party to testify to his books despite the fact
that he is otherwise incompetent under section 2. Only incidentally,
and in the Dead Man situation, does section 3 purport to set forth the
foundation requirements for the admission of book accounts; other-
wise, the common law has continued to govern.8 0
Nevertheless, the impression has persisted that in some fashion sec-
tion 3 controls the admissibility of business records generally. The
Supreme Court on occasion has so stated,' 3' counsel continue so to
argue, 32 and the Legislature has so assumed in amending the section
by adding "other record or document," together with provisions for
microfilming. 13 3
Section 3 does not apply in criminal cases.134 It is limited to the
books, records, or documents of a party who would otherwise be in-
competent under section 2, and it applies then only if the claim or
defense is founded thereon. It has no application to books or records
of a third person. It does not deal with the source of the information
which has been recorded.
These manifest deficiencies, plus the uncertain and unsatisfactory
129 11. Laws 1867, at 183.
130 Stettauer v. White, 98 Ill. 72 (1881); House v. Beak, 141 I11. 290, 30 N.E. 1065
(1892).
1'1 Trainor v. German-American Say. Ass'n, 204 111. 616, 68 N.E. 650 (1903) (involv-
ing the admissibility of the books of plaintiff, which was a corporation, hence raising
no question of competency of witnesses).
132 National Malleable Castings Co. v. Iroquois Steel Co., 333 111. 588, 165 N.E. 199
(1929); Secco v. Chicago Transit Authority, 6 Ill. App.2d 266, 127 N.E.2d 266 (1955).
133 Ill. Laws 1949, at 919; Ill. Laws 1951, at 1331; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, S 3 (1959).
134 Johnson v. Daley, 403 Ill. 338, 86 N.E.2d 350 (1949) ; Bradley v. Casey, 415 IIl. 574,
114 N.E.2d 618 (1953).
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state of the case law, call for the adoption of a comprehensive statute
on the subject. Section 3 should be amended to make it clearly deal
only with the subject of competency of witnesses, otherwise incom-
petent under section 2, to testify to business records, leaving the ques-
tion of the requirements for the records themselves to be dealt with
in a general section on that subject. A new section should then be
added to the effect that a memorandum or record is admissible if: (a)
it was made in the regular course of business; (b) it was the regular
course for a person with personal knowledge to make the record or
to transmit the information for the record; and (c) it was made at or
near the time. Provision should be made for establishing the accuracy
of the record by testimony of a witness familiar with the routine of
its preparation, thus dispensing with questions as to the necessity of
calling all participants. Absence of an item ordinarily recorded should
be admissible to prove its nonoccurrence. Microfilming should be
covered broadly. "Business" should be defined to include all regularly
organized activities. Regularly recorded matters which in themselves
constitute exceptions to the hearsay rule should be admissible.
Only a certain predisposition on the part of lawyers to look under
the bed for things which are not there has prevented constructive ac-
tion in this area.
